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Abstract
The present paper analyses the challenge to redistribution pro-
grams posed by an increase in skill premium. The increase in skill
premium, which we observe in most OECD countries, aﬀects taxation
through its eﬀect on education and migration incentives. We demon-
strate that in countries with a relatively egalitarian wage distribution,
the response to an increased gap in wages is likely to be increased
redistributive taxation, whereas the response in countries with a more
inegalitarian pre-tax income distribution, is likely to be a reduction in
taxation and redistribution.
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1 Introduction
Income inequality has increased in most OECD countries during the last
decades, as documented by for instance Atkinson (2003) and Gottschalk and
Smeeding (1997). The rise in inequality is primarily due to increased wage
dispersion (Saez and Veall, 2005). Economic integration and technological
change are important reasons for this development. Economic integration, in
the form of increased competition from low-wage countries, and technological
advances in information and communication technology, have raised the de-
mand for skilled workers relative to unskilled workers in developed economies
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and increased the skill premium.1 The combined eﬀect of technological ad-
vances and reduced market barriers has paved the way for “superstars”, in-
dividuals with the highest abilities whose economic outreach has expanded
at the expense of the somewhat less talented individuals (Rosen, 1981).
These developments also pose a challenge to national taxation and redis-
tribution programs. The ambition of the present paper is to analyze the eﬀect
of an increase in skill premium on redistributive taxation. In our analysis,
the unskilled are the decisive voters and thereby determine the tax rate. The
skilled individuals can choose whether or not to develop their talents by tak-
ing an education, and whether to stay in their native country or to relocate.
An increase in the skill premium makes it more attractive for talented people
to take an education. In this way, an increase in the skill premium increases
the potential for raising the tax level without discouraging skill formation in
the economy. On the other hand, an increase in the skill premium also re-
duces the relative importance of fixed migration costs, and thus increases the
mobility of skilled workers. This intensifies tax competition between coun-
tries, and may thus reduce taxation and redistribution. Unskilled workers
wish to maximize the tax base, and therefore would like the skilled to take an
education and stay in the country. Education and migration thus constitute
two constraints on the tax policy.2
Migration as a constraint on taxation is an important element in our
model. While actual migration flows may appear to be too small to repre-
sent a real challenge to polices of taxation and redistribution, the potential
relocation of a relatively small group of highly paid professionals may indeed
pose a serious challenge for policies of redistribution, as emphasised by for
instance Wildasin (2003). By choosing residency, a worker can often choose
where to pay taxes. Since the taxation of highly-compensated workers ac-
counts for a very large fraction of tax revenues, the fiscal implications of
such relocation can be very high. The importance of high-income tax payers
for the total tax income in developed countries can be illustrated by some
numbers from the United States. In 1999, one-fifth of personal income taxes
were paid by only 0.16 percent of the taxpayers; the top 2 percent of the
taxpayers paid over 40 percent of all personal income taxes. Wildasin (2003:
6) stresses that “the presence of absence of these high-income taxpayers is a
1Feenstra and Hanson (1999) show that technological change is the main cause of rising
inequality in market incomes in the United States.
2In a related paper, we investigate equilibrium taxation in the face of eﬃciency costs
and tax avoidance, see Bjorvatn and Cappelen (2005).
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matter of great importance for the US tax system.”
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the
model and Section 3 contains the analysis. We start the analysis by studying
the education constraint and the migration constraint separately, before we
conclude the analysis by combining the two constraints. The final section
concludes.
2 Model
There are two equally sized countries, a and b. In each country there are two
types of people, unskilled workers and skilled workers. Prior to any reloca-
tion, the number of unskilled workers, nu, and skilled workers, ns, is assumed
to be the same in both countries. Our focus is on tax motivated migration,
and we therefore abstract from migration of the unskilled. Furthermore,
we normalize the size of the unskilled group in each country to unity. The
skilled are, however, mobile, and hence the number of skilled residing in
country i = a, b, nsi, may be diﬀerent from the number of skilled born in
that country, ns. The population in country i, ni, is therefore ni = 1 + nsi.
We assume that nsi < 1, so that the unskilled always are in majority.
The unskilled have a pre-tax wage normalized to unity, i.e., wu = 1 and
the skilled earn wsi = 1+ eis, where s is the skill premium and ei is a binary
variable for education, taking the value zero or one depending on whether
or not the skilled in country i choose to develop their talent. The unskilled
have no talent to develop, and hence never take an education. For a skilled
person, developing his or her talent by taking an education involves a fixed
cost c. This education cost can be interpreted as tuition fees and forgone
income during years of education. We assume that c < s so that it is always
profitable for the skilled to develop their talent in the absence of taxation.
The redistribution program is determined by majority vote, which in the
present setup means according to the preferences of the unskilled worker. The
vote determines the level of the linear income tax, ti ∈ (0, 1). Tax revenues
are spent on a uniform transfer, θi, which is received by all residents in the
country. In a symmetric equilibrium all the skilled workers make the same








1 + (1 + s)nsi for ei = 1
1 + nsi for ei = 0
(2)
is the total income generated in country i. The disposable income of the
unskilled median voter in country i, including transfers, is given by Iui =
1− ti + θi which can be expressed as:
Iui = 1 + ti
∙




where the second term is the net gain to the unskilled from the tax and
redistribution program. Similarly, the income of the skilled is:
Isi = 1 + ti
∙
ωi − (1 + nsi)
1 + nsi
¸
+ ei (s (1− ti)− c) , (4)
where the last term captures the net gain from education. Clearly, from
(3) we see that for ei = 1, the unskilled median voter benefits from higher
taxes. But she also has an interest in the skilled taking an education, and
in attracting as many educated people as possible to the country (or at least
avoiding emigration of its native skilled). Since high taxes may reduce the
incentive of the skilled to take an education, and may reduce the number of
skilled, there is a trade-oﬀ between the benefits of higher taxation and the
possible reduction in the tax base that may follow from high taxes. We can
thus view education and migration as two constraints on tax policy.
We should emphasise at the outset that the main contribution of the
present paper is no the identification of education and migration as con-
straints on taxation, as these are fairly well known from the literature.
Rather, the value added of our paper is the analysis of how these two con-
straints together aﬀect equilibrium taxation. In particular, we focus on how
exogenous changes in the pre-tax skill premium determine the importance of
the education constraint relative to the migration constraint. As we shall see,
the identification of the binding constraint in turn determines the qualitative
eﬀect of changes in the skill premium on equilibrium taxation.
2.1 Analysis
We start the analysis by focusing on the education constraint, and assume
that workers are perfectly immobile. We then focus on the migration con-
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straint, by assuming that the skilled are educated. Finally, we combine the
two constraints, and derive the main results of the paper.
2.2 The education constraint
In the absence of mobility, i.e., in autarky, we have that nsa = nsb = ns.
The skilled workers in this case make a single choice, namely whether or
not to develop their talent. Each agent behaves atomistically, taking the
tax base in his or her country, ωi, and thereby the transfers θi, as given,
and unaﬀected by the individual educational decision. The skilled workers in
country i choose to take an education if the net gain of doing so is positive,
i.e., if ei (s (1− ti)− c) ≥ 0. The optimal educational choice is thus given
by:
e∗i =
1 if ti ≤ (s− c) /s
0 if ti > (s− c) /s
. (5)
Using (5) in (2) and then substituting into (3), we find the autarky income




if ti ≤ (s− c) /s
1 if ti > (s− c) /s
. (6)
Clearly, the median voter will set a tax rate that makes the skilled indif-
ferent between taking an education and not (and therefore choose education).
Hence, the tax rate in autarky in both countries is such that the education





which applies for s ≥ c, i.e., given that it is profitable for a skilled to
take an education, prior to taxation. The equilibrium autarky tax rate is
increasing in the skill premium and decreasing in the cost of education.
2.3 The migration constraint
Consider now the choice of tax policy when skilled workers are mobile. We
abstract from educational choice, and assume that the skilled workers are
educated. We also assume that the populations are large, so that each skilled
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worker, in deciding whether or not to migrate, ignores the impact of migration
on the transfers in the potential destination region.
Migration is costly. We shall assume that these costs are emotional, and
therefore do not aﬀect the tax base in the destination country. For simplicity,
assume that each migrant faces a fixed emotional cost m of living in the
foreign jurisdiction.
Starting from the symmetric autarky situation, where nsi = ns, and using
(2) and (4), the gain (gross of any migration costs) to a skilled individual
moving from region j to region i can be found as:
Isi − Isj =
(tj − ti) s
1 + ns
. (8)
If Isi−Isj > m, implying that ti < tj−m (1 + ns) /s, there is immigration
to country i, and its income would be given by:
ωi = 1 + 2ns (1 + s) if (tj − ti) >
m (1 + ns)
s
. (9)
If, on the other hand, Isj − Isi = (ti − tj) s/ (1 + ns) > m, the skilled
workers from i would emigrate to j. This takes place if ti > tj+m (1 + ns) /s,
and would result in country i income:
ωi = 1 if (ti − tj) >
m (1 + ns)
s
. (10)
For intermediate tax diﬀerentials between country a and b, there is no
migration. Income for both countries is then:
ωa = ωb = 1+2ns (1 + s) if −
m (1 + ns)
s
≤ (tj− ti) ≤
m (1 + ns)
s
. (11)
The median voters in a and b would never choose a tax rate that would
trigger a “brain drain” out of their respective countries. Hence, in equi-
librium, we know that there will be no migration. This also implies that
in equilibrium, it is not profitable for any country to implement a low tax
strategy that would attract the skilled from the other country. What is the
income country i could generate from such a low tax strategy? To see this,
note first that the optimal tax level in a low tax strategy, from the viewpoint
of the median voter in i, is such that the skilled and educated foreigners are
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indiﬀerent between migrating or not (and therefore migrate). This tax level
can be found from the condition Isi − Isj = m which results in:
tLi = tj −
m (1 + ns)
s
. (12)


















= 1−mns + stjns1+ns
is true is true
Using (6) and (13), we find that in a symmetric equilibrium, where ta =
tb = t, the two countries are indiﬀerent between choosing a low tax strategy





can be expressed as:
tC =




Neither country has an incentive to deviate from this tax level. Amarginal
increase in taxation by country i would induce country j to implement the
low tax strategy, which is clearly not in the interest of country i. A marginal
reduction in taxation by country i would not aﬀect the tax base in either
country, and would therefore only lead to a reduction in redistribution in
country i, which is also not in the best interest of its median voters. The
median voters in both countries reason in the same way, and hence, tC is a
Nash-equilibrium.
We observe that tC is increasing in the mobility cost m and the number
of skilled people ns in the economy, and decreases in the skill premium,
s. The reason why tC increases in ns is perhaps not obvious. It can be
explained as follows. For a given t, Iu is a positive, but concave function
of ns. Hence, attracting skilled workers, starting from a high ns, yields less
additional benefit than attracting these individuals starting from a lower ns.
Intuitively, attracting skilled migrants when the native population of skilled
people is low has a much stronger eﬀect on average income, and hence the
potential for redistribution, than when the native population of skilled is
realtively large. Therefore, a higher level of ns weakens tax competition, and
leads to a higher tC.
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2.4 The education and migration constraint
We now consider equilibrium tax policy when both constraints apply. The
tax rate that maximizes the income of the median voter, t∗, takes into account
that the median voter will never set the tax rate above tC or tA. In other
words:
t∗ = min(tA, tC).
This implies that the eﬀect of an increase in the skill premium, s, depends
on the initial level of the skill premium. The critical level of s at which tA = tC
can be found as:
sˆ = 2m (1 + ns (2 + ns)) + c.
For s < sˆ, tA < tC, implying that education is the binding constraint. An
increase in s would then result in an increase in t∗. For s > sˆ, tA > tC, so
that migration is the binding constraint. An increase in s would then lead to
a decrease in t∗. Clearly, an increase in m, c, or ns increases sˆ and thereby
increases the range of s for which t is a positive function of s, and vice versa.
We illustrate the equilibrium tax rate as a function of the skill premium in
Figure 1
From Figure 1 we observe that for s > c, the tax rate is increasing in the
skill premium until the skill premium reaches the critical level sˆ. Thereafter,
it decreases in s. There is in other words a hump shaped relationship between
the skill premium and the tax rate. An implication of this is that an increase
in the skill premium will have qualitatively diﬀerent eﬀects on the tax rate in
a country depending on the initial level of the skill premium. The observation
that the qualitative eﬀect of increased wage inequality depends on the level of
inequality, provides one possible explanation of what is sometimes called the
“redistribution puzzle”. This puzzle refers to the lack of empirical support for
the hypothesis, generated by standard median voter models, that increased
pre-tax income inequality should result in increased redistribution (Perotti,
1996; Bassett et al., 1999). The figure also illustrates the eﬀect of a reduction
in the migration cost,m. The reduction inm leads to a downward shift in the
tC-curve, to tCm. This shift reduces the critical value of s to sˆm. Clearly, the






Figure 1: Taxation, migration and the skill premium
the eﬀect of a reduction in the mobility cost depends on the level of the skill
premium.
Figure 2 illustrates the eﬀect on the tax rate from a reduction in mobility
costs for three countries, a, b, and c. Country a has a low skill premium, sa,
country b has a moderately high skill premium sb, and country c has a high
skill premium sc.
Assume that initially the country b and c have the same tax rate, t1, which
is higher than the tax rate of the country with the low skill premium, t2. A
reduction in mobility costs moves the equilibrium for country b from point b
to b0 and that of country c from point c to c0, while leaving the equilibrium of
country a unchanged. We observe that this reduction in mobility costs has
caused a divergence in the tax rates of the more inegalitarian countries, due



















Figure 2: Lower mobility cost, convergence and divergence
t3, and only a moderate fall in the tax rate of the moderately inegalitarian
country b, from t1 to t2. On the other hand, there has been a convergence
between the tax rates of country b and the most egalitarian country a, with
the tax rate now being identical for the two. Hence, depending on the level
of pre-tax income inequality, a reduction in mobility costs may lead to a
convergence, divergence, or no change at all in international tax rates.
3 Conclusion
Our analysis sheds light on the way in which increased skill premium may af-
fect education and migration incentives, and thereby equilibrium tax policy.
The central result of our model is that redistributive tax rates are highest
for intermediate levels of the skill premium. Since the skill premium can be
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seen as a measure of pre-tax income inequality in our model, the analysis
thus predicts that for countries starting with a relatively low level of pre-tax
income inequality, the policy response to an increase in the skill premium is
first to implement more ambitious redistribution programs. If the process
of increased inequality in market incomes continues, however, the policy re-
sponse will at some point be reversed. The combined eﬀect of increased
pre-tax inequality and less ambitious redistribution program will then cause
disposable income inequalities to rise sharply.
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